The historic oddity of this situation points to a common dynamic Americans now face at home and abroad. Our partners in the international order we created - some of whom we conquered to make it possible - are now seeking to defend it from us. Let's say that again, Defend it from us. How do we now as loyal Americans look at the warnings of the French and the Germans, as well as the British and our other erstwhile allies' warnings? This is a complicated question which different people, depending on their professions and governmental responsibilities and personal dispositions, must answer in different ways. But we cannot ignore the fact that the American experiment is now in a kind of exile - taken refuge elsewhere - and the executive power of the American state now under a kind of, hopefully temporary, occupation.
Marshall suggests limits to the analogy of Nazi Germany, which dismantled the system that allowed it to come to power, and I won't repeat that here other than to recommend reading the post.
It seems to me there are a range of dangers here. One is the resiliency of American institutions in resisting the most destructive elements of this Administration. Congress as a whole does not seem interested in identifying and limited the potential damage, although some Republicans are in a position to do so. Senators John McCain and Lindsay Graham in particular come to and, but there are others who might join them: Lamar Alexander, Lisa Murkowski, Susan Collins includes. Note that the House of Representatives appears to be a wasteland, in this regard. Public opposition is not really an institution, per se, but active citizen opposition, and high disapproval rates may well help to motivate some members of Congress, particularly as the 2018 elections approach.
The resilience of international institutions is second concern. There are attacks by authoritarian-minded right wing movements throughout Europe. Hungary and Poland in particular are under such governments, and France and Germany have active groups seeking to capture enough votes to direct those governments. But even if these countries are able to overcome their own domestic concerns, there is an inter-national dynamic. Why should France or Germany ever really trust the United States again? The same goes for Baltic and Balkan nations. My fear is that some of the damage to the international world order may thus be permanent.
If this is correct, then we will need to think about what a real multi-polar world will look like. The United States will not fade into irrelevancy, if only due to the size of our economy and the strength of our military. But any moral authority will be diminished, and other countries may be wary of depending on the United States. A slightly different dynamic holds in East Asia, where China is positioned to rival United States projections of power. Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others will have to negotiate this dynamic. The European dynamic does not yet present an alternative single power as a rival. As much as Russia would like to be just that, it has the military power, but not the economy to do so.
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